Abstract. -The generalization of the problem of adaptive competition, known as the minority game, to the case of K possible choices for each player is addressed, and mapped onto a system of interacting perceptrons with input and output units of the type of K-states Potts-spins. An optimal solution of the minority game as well as the dynamical evolution of the adaptive strategies of the players are solved analytically for a general K and compared with numerical simulations.
Considerable progress in the theoretical understanding of market phenomena has been achieved by the study of the minority game. This prototypical model describes a system of agents interacting through a market mechanism [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . The game is based on the idea that the behavior of the agents is determined by the economic rule of supply and demand. According to this rule, given the available options (such as buy/sell), an agent wins if he chooses the minority action. The research of this game has been focused on cases in which each agent can choose between two options using its most efficient strategy, where the strategies remain unchanged throughout the game. However, in real market, many situations of interest involve more than two decision options as well as agents with dynamical strategies. Therefore, it is tempting to investigate cases with more than two possible choices provided to agents with dynamical strategies. In a recent study of the later extension [7] it was shown, that a certain updating rule of the strategies of the agents improves the efficiency of the market, which is measured by the global profit of the agents. In this letter we generalize the aforementioned work to a multi-choices minority game, namely a game with general K decision states.
The multi-choices minority game consists of N players (agents) and K possible decisions. In each step, each one of the players chooses one of the K states, aiming to choose the state which is chosen by the smallest number of agents. The minority decisions generate a time series, whose term at time t, x t , has an integer value between 1 and K according to the minority decision. The information provided to each player is the history vector of size M , whose components are the last M minority states.
The multi-choices minority game can be modeled by neural networks in the following way: each one of the N players is represented by a perceptron of a size M . The weights belonging to the ith player are {w ij } where j = 1, ..., M . All N perceptrons have a common input which c EDP Sciences consists of M components x 1 , ..., x M , where each one of the components can take one of the K integers, 1, 2, ..., K.
The dynamics are defined by the following steps. In the first step, each one of the perceptrons calculates the K induced local fields. For instance, the field h im induced by the mth state on player i is defined as the summation over all weights belong to the ith perceptron with input equals to m
In the second step, each player chooses its state, {σ i }, following the maximal induced field
where σ i is the output (chosen state) of ith perceptron. In the third step, the occupancy of each state is calculated
where it is clear that ρ N ρ = N . The output of the network is the minority decision
where Out stands for the minority decision. The game can also be represented by a feedforward network M : N : 1 (M input units, N hidden units and 1 output). All units (input, hidden, output) are represented by K-states Potts-spins. The weights {w ij } are from the input units to the hidden units, and the weights from the hidden units to the output are all equal −1. The dynamics of hidden and output units are similar to zero temperature dynamics of Potts-spin systems [8, 9] ; following the maximal induced field. The free parameters in our game are the M N weights, {w ij }, from the input to the hidden units. Their values will be determined by the strategy adopted by each one of the players. Our local dynamical rules are based on the generalization of the on-line Hebbian learning rule for K = 2 [7] to general K-states Potts model with the following updating rule;
where min stands for the minority state, η is the learning rate and the sign + indicates the next time step. Note that all agents are using the same dynamical strategy. The score of the game is determined similarly to the Ising case. Players belong to the minority (N min players) gain Q + and other players (N − N min ) gain Q − , where Q + > Q − . Note that in most previous works Q + was chosen to be 1 and Q − was chosen to be either 0 or −1. The global profit in such cases is
It is clear that the maximization of the global profit U is equivalent to the maximization of N min , which is bounded from above by N/K. Note that in the Ising case each player belongs either to the minority or to the majority, where in the Potts case the situation is more complex. The score may depend on the exact values of {N i } (the score decreases with N ρ ), hence the total profit U = U ({N i }). In such a case the maximization of the total profit may differ from the maximization of N min , and will be discussed briefly in the end of this Letter.
Before we turn to discuss the guideline of the derivation of the results, which are more involved than for the Ising case, let us present the main results: (a) The score and the dynamics are formulated analytically for general K, the number of possible decisions. Exact results are obtained for K ≤ 6 and asymptotically K → ∞. Results for intermediate values of K were obtained from simulations. (b) A relaxation to the optimal score is achieved for small learning rates. (c) Regarding the optimal case, the deviation of minority group size from N/K is found to be non-monontonic with K. (d) The total score is independent of the size of the history (M the size of the input) available for the agents. (e) All agents are using the same dynamical strategy and gain on average (over time) the same profit. Our system does not undergo a phase transition to a state where the symmetry among the agents is broken into losers and winners. [4, 5] . Throughout the investigation of the game we assume that the memory size M is larger than the number of players N (otherwise the Potts configuration is impossible). Albeit, simulations of the same dynamic for systems with M < N show even better results for the global profit.
In case where the maximization of the global profit U is identical to the maximization of N min the quantity of interest is
where the symbol < > indicates an average over input units, and N/K is the average number of players in each state. Note that in our calculations the input vector presented to the players at each step of the game consists of random components [4, 7] , instead of the true history. Nevertheless, simulations indicates that the system behavior is only slightly affected by the randomness of the inputs and the game properties remain similar.
For random players, each weight (among the M N weights {w ij }), is chosen from a given unbiased distribution and a variance 1/M . Hence, the distribution of the overlap R between weights belonging to any two players ρ and φ
is a Gaussian with zero mean and variance 1/M . In the thermodynamic limit and for M > N , one can show that in the leading order the distribution of the overlap between each pair is an independent random variable. For random players and K = 2 one finds < ǫ 2 >= 1/4 [7] , however, for general K even the derivation of a similar quantity is non-trivial. The two cornerstones of the calculations below are the probability for a given configuration P ({N ρ }) and the degeneracy of such a configuration D({N ρ }) = N !/ΠN ρ !.
In the large N limit, the typical deviation of the size of each group from N/K is expected to scale with √ N . Hence we define:
where it is clear that ρ ǫ ρ = 0 and without the loss of generality we assume N min = N 1 ≤ N ρ ∀ρ > 1. Using eq. (9) the degeneracy as a function of {ǫ ρ } is given by
and where R indicates the average of R ρφ and for
The quantity < ǫ min 2 > R=0 was calculated numerically for K = 3, 4, 5, 6 and found to be equal to ∼ 0.313, 0.322, 0.320, 0.309, respectively (see Fig. 1 ). Results obtained from simulations with N = 5000 and K ≤ 6 are in an excellent agreement with eq. (11). For K > 6 the reported results in Fig. 1 were derived only from simulations and are in an excellent agreement with the asymptotic behavior of eq. (11), < ǫ 
So far we have compared < ǫ min 2 > and < ǫ 2 > for random players, where the average overlap is zero. Without breaking the symmetry among the players, the weights can be represented by N weight vectors which are symmetrically spread around their center of mass. More precisely, we denote the weight vector of the ith perceptron as w i , and assume that it can be expressed as
where the center of mass C ≡ 1 N i w i and {g i } are N unit vectors of rank M obeying the symmetry
Hence, the total profit and N min are functions of only two parameters, C and R. It is clear that the maximization of the total profit or N min (as for the case K = 2) is obtained when C = 0 and R = −1/(N −1), which is the maximal achievable homogeneous repulsion among N vectors of rank M > N . The repulsion is the natural tendency of each player in the minority game, since the goal is to act differently than other players. Without a cooperation which breaks the players into sub-groups, the maximal homogeneous repulsion is R = −1/(N − 1). The two questions of interest are the following: (a) What is < ǫ 2 > and < ǫ min 2 > as a function of K for the optimal solution, C = 0 and R = −1/(N − 1)? (b) Is the optimal solution achievable by local dynamical rules for each one of the players? We first examine the former question regarding the optimal solution, and then we turn to study the dynamical behavior of the players.
The average deviation of the number of players in each state from N/K at C = 0 and for R = O(1/N ) can be calculated analytically. The main idea is that this quantity can be calculated similarly to eq. (11), or via < ǫ 2 >= 1/N < (
The simplification of the later expression is such that an average over only a pair of players has to be done. The result as a function of K gives
where µ ss = [
). Regarding the optimal score, the quantity of a particular interest is < ǫ . This quantity has to be compared with < ǫ 2 min > R=0 in order to estimate the improvement in the average global gain relative to the random case. Note that the calculation of eq. (10) for R = 0 is nontrivial since P K ({ǫ ρ }) is no longer independent of the configuration {ǫ ρ }. However, we can overcome this difficulty in the following way. For R = O(1/N ) one can show that in the leading order P K ({ǫ ρ }) has the same form as D K ({ǫ ρ }):
where the exact value of A(R) is unknown. The observation that both P K ({ǫ ρ }) and D K ({ǫ ρ }) have the same dependence on {ǫ ρ } (eqs. (10) and (16)) indicates that the ratio < ǫ 2 min > / < ǫ 2 > is independent of R = O(1/N ), and in particular:
This property can be easily derived by rescaling ǫ ρ → A(R)ǫ ρ in the integral representation (eq. (11)) of each one of the four terms in eq. (17). The same prefactor appearing both in the denominator and in the numerator, and the dependence of β K on R via A(R) is cancelled out. Using eq. (17), < ǫ min
can be obtained indirectly from the knowledge of the other three terms. Two of these three terms are given by eq. (15), while < ǫ min 2 > R=0 is given by eq. (11). Results for < ǫ min
are presented in Fig. 1 . In order to confirm our analytical results we performed simulations for the optimal case, eqs. (13) and (14), with C = 0. The simulations were done in two stages. In the first stage, N normalized vectors of rank M , obeying the constraints that the overlap among each pair is equal to −1/(N − 1), are generated using a recursive process. The details of the algorithm will be given elsewhere [10] . In the second stage, < ǫ min 2 > and < ǫ 2 > were averaged over about 10 5 randomly chosen inputs for a system with N = 400 and M = 5000. An excellent agreement between simulations and analytical results was obtained (see Fig. 1 ). The improvement in the global gain can be measured by the ratio Γ K =< ǫ min 2 > R=0 / < ǫ min 2 > R= −1
. This ratio decreases monotonically with K such that its maximal value Γ 2 = 2.7548 and for K → ∞ Γ K → 1 (inset of Fig. 1 ).
So far we derived the properties of the optimal solution for different values of K. Now we are turning to the second question: is the optimal solution achievable by local dynamical rules (eq. 5)? After averaging eq. (5) over j and in the limit where the number of examples, αM , scales with the number of inputs M , one can find the following equation of motion for the center of mass dC
where < > denotes an average over the random examples. For large M , in the leading order each input vector divides each weight vector into K equal groups of size M/K. The minority state is the one whose group of weights gives the minimal sum. Using eq. (13) and M, N → ∞, < j C j δ xj ,min > is the average minimal sum of a set of M/K center of mass components, {C j }. These M quantities are random variables with zero mean and variance
Hence, for a given K, eq. (18) indicates a linear relation between the fixed point value of C and the learning rate η. As η → 0, C → 0 and the system approaches the optimal configuration. The interplay between C and η was confirmed by simulations, where finite size effects decay as the size of the system becomes larger. This effect is depicted in Fig. 2 for K = 3. The explicit dependence of < ǫ min 2 /N > R on C can be found for R ∼ O(1/N ) via the relation
Results of simulations for < ǫ min 2 > R as a function of C for N = 103 and M = 200 are presented in the inset of Fig. 2 . An excellent agreement between the analytical prediction and simulations was obtained in the regime of C ∼ O(1/ √ N ) (corresponding to R ∼ O(1/N )). As we have pointed out before, the function according to which the profit is awarded is not necessarily boolean (eq. (6)). In fact, the model is more realistic when the profit of a player is related to the size of his group, as well as to the size of the other groups. For instance, the score of a player in state ρ, S ρ , can be determined as follows: S ρ = −(N ρ − N min ) 2 . In this case the average global gain per player U = −K(< ǫ min 2 > + < ǫ 2 >). Eq. (17) implies that: U = −K(1 + β) < ǫ min 2 >. This case fits our analysis since it has the required feature that the maximization of the global gain is equivalent to the maximization of the minority group. Moreover, scores which involve higher moments of ǫ min and ǫ, can still be calculated for the maximal repulsion case, using the same methods that have been used in this work. However, such scores may not fulfill the required condition. Yet, future study is needed to determine weather the optimal configuration for such cases remains the maximal repulsion.
I. K., W. K. and R. M. acknowledge a partial support by GIF. 
